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Hilley: State
v. Rother
RECENT
DECISIONS

first requirement-is the accused properly informed of the charge against
him?
Chief Justice Adair in his dissenting opinion sets forth an elaborate
analysis of the information and comes to the conclusion that it sufficiently informed Hale of the charge against him. The essence of his argument
is that under the Montana Code the legislature has provided the courts with
the yardstick to measure the sufficiency of an information. Section 94-6401
states that the Code alone governs the form and sufficiency of criminal
pleadings. In section 94-6410 the Code provides that words used in the information are given their common meaning except words and phrases defined by law, which are construed according to their legal meaning. Finally section 94-6412 lists the tests by which to determine the sufficiency of an
information.'
Regardless of the correctness of his conclusion the fact remains that he proceeded in the proper manner-an analysis of the information in the light of the Code provisions.
The intent of the legislature in enacting the above mentioned sections
was clearly to do away with the technical and highly impractical requirements of sufficiency under the common law, and to substitute in their place
much simpler tests. It is suggested, therefore, that the majority opinion in
the instant case, in requiring a more complicated information, has taken a
backward step in the progress toward more liberal application of the rules
of criminal pleading and practice.
BRUCE D.

CRIPPEN

Rother was alleged
to have signed a false affidavit in the presence of a notary public in Lake
County, Montana, certifying that he was lawfully entitled to a state gasoline
tax refund.' The State Board of Equalization, in Lewis and Clark County,
received the affidavit through the mails. There was a fair inference that
the defendant mailed the letter or gave it to another to be mailed in Missoula or Lake County. Upon prosecution for perjury in Lewis and Clark
County the court directed a verdict for the defendant on the ground that
the prosecution had failed to prove venue. On appeal to the Montana
Supreme Court, held, affirmed. The crime of perjury is completed at the
place where the perjurer parts with possession of the affidavit by deposit
in the mails or delivery to an agent for mailing "with the intent that it be
uttered or published as true." State v. Rother, 303 P.2d 393 (Mont. 1956)
(Justices Adair and Bottomly dissenting).
It is fundamental that a crime is deemed committed in the county,
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-VENE-PERJURY.-Defendant

"The indictment or information is sufficient, if it can be understood therefrom6. That the act or omission charged as the offense is clearly and distinctly set
forth in ordinary and concise language, without repetition, and in such manner a.
to enable a person of common understanding to know what is intended;
7. That the act or omission charged as the offense is stated with such a degree
of certainty as to enable the court to pronounce judgment upon a conviction, according to the right of the case."
'REVISED CODES OF MONTANA, 1947, § 84-1818. All section numbers cited herein refer
to the REVIsED CODES OF MONTANA, 1947, unless noted otherwise.
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state, or country where its object and purpose is completed.! Montana has
also adopted this proposition in section 94-5602, which provides that where
an offense is commenced in another state and consummated in Montana,
the jurisdiction is in the county where the offense was consummated. This
is true whether an innocent or guilty agent intervenes or not. Apparently
the legislature intended to go even further in passing a double venue statute,
stating that venue may be in either county or in any of the counties involved
when the "acts or effects thereof constituting or requisite to the consummation of the offense occur in two or more counties. "' Cases involving the
mails have generally reached the conclusion that the offense is completed
upon receipt of the letter. In a case of embezzlement it was held that the
crime could not be completed until the letter had arrived and exerted influence on the victim's mind.' Similarly, the United States Supreme Court, in
an opinion by Justice Holmes, held that the crime of solicitation could not
be complete until the letter purporting to solicit had reached its destination,
as it might have miscarried or have been burned before it could accomplish
its purpose
In the instant case, both the majority and minority opinions applied
section 94-3809 to show where the offense was consummated. This statute
provides:
The making of a deposition or certificate is deemed to be complete,
within the provisions of this chapter, from the time when it is delivered by the accused to any other person, with the intent that it
be uttered or published as true.
The majority opinion believed that the words "any other person" could
refer to anyone to whom the defendant chose to deliver the letter to be
mailed or taken to the post office, whether post office employee or private
person, and that the requisite consummation took place at the point of this
delivery. The majority of the court has thus given the statute an extremely
limited and literal interpretation without considering the policy and legislative intent behind section 94-5605 providing for double venue.
Many analogous statutes relating to such crimes as forgery,' libel' and
counterfeiting coin 8 use the words "uttered," "published," "alters," or
"passes" to show when an offense is deemed to be complete. Decisions of
the Montana court under the forgery statutes have held that where a person
uses the mails to complete his crime the venue is only at the place where the
letter is received
In a notable case a false statement was mailed in one
county and addressed to the banking superintendent in another county.
The court held that the crime was consummated in the second county and
could have been tried in either county.'
'United

States v. Thayer, 209 U.S. 39 (1908) ; State v. Tummons, 225 Mo. App. 429,
37 S.W.2d 499 (1931) ; Ex parte Lucas, 33 Okla. Crim. 407, 243 Pac. 990 (1926).
3R.C.M. 1947, § 94-5605.
'Regina v. Rogers, 14 Cox C. C. 22 (1877).
5
United States v. Thayer, 209 U.S. 39 (1908).
0
R.C.M. 1947, §§ 94-2001, 94-2006, 94-2007.
1R.C.M. 1947, § 94-2802.
8
R.C.M. 1947, § 94-2008.
'State v. Hudson, 13 Mont. 112, 32 Pac. 413, 19 L.R.A. 775 (1893).
1
State v. Cassill, 70 Mont. 433, 227 Pac. 49 (1924). The majority relied on this case
to show that Montana recognizes both perjury and false swearing. Here, the offense was false swearing under a statute controlling banks, rather than under the
general perjury statutes.
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It is apparent that the decision in the instant case has caused , the question of the venue of an offense to become uncertain. The majority's holding that the state must prove venue, and that the crime was consummated
where the defendant relinquished possession of the affidavit, raises several
important questions. May a defendant escape all liability for a crime
against the state if the state is unable to prove the county where the relinquishment of possession took place when the instrument was in fact perjurious? It may be impossible for the state to establish where the defendant relinquished possession, particularly if he goes to any pains to hide his
crime.'
If the defendant delivered the letter to another in New York to be
mailed for him, and then received his refund upon returning to this state,
would New York be likely to prosecute the case for Montana? The court in
the principal case held that Lewis and Clark County was not the county in
which the crime was consummated. Hence, this state would have no jurisdiction to prosecute in the hypothetical situation posed above, because both
the jurisdictional statute, section 94-5602, and the double venue statute, section 94-5605, are dependent upon where the offense is deemed to be complete. Surely this was not the intent of the legislature.
Venue, requiring trial at the place where the crime was consummated,
developed at the common law to prevent a defendant from incurring great
expense and hardship by having to go a great distance for the purpose of
defending a lawsuit.' Although there must be some rule governing the
place, of trial, some authorities believe that venue has only become a means
of obstructing justice by requiring unnecessary expense, time and effort.
In recent years a number of articles have called for a revision of the venue
statutes.' It appears that some liberalization is needed. Four states have
statutes providing that the failure of a defendant to attack venue improperly laid constitutes a waiver.1' These states have made venue non-jurisdictional, which tends to eliminate appeals based on a failure to prove venue
with the ultimate result of remanding or dismissing the complaint.
BENJAMIN

W.

HILA.EY

"The state, in this situation, could have retained the envelopes in which the refund
requests were mailed as prima facie evidence of venue. This would not appear to
be practical, however, and in other situations this solution might be impossible.
"30 TEXAS L. REV. 547 (1952). Of course venue was originally based on the "concept that a jury of the vicinage was the source rather than the arbiter of the evidence." See ORII)D, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE FROM ARREST To Appr.x. 367 (1947).
zStevens, Venue Statutes: Diagnosis and Proposed Cure, 49 MICH. L. REv. 307

(1951) ; 30 TExAS L. REv. 547 (1952). See also Grouse, A Critique of Canadian
Criminal Legislation, 12 CAN. B. Rsv. 545, 575 (1934), for a discussion of why
Canada has eliminated venue in criminal procedure, and 1 STEPHEN, HISTORY OF
THE CRIMINAL LAw OF ENGLAND

273 (1883), for reference to England's elimination

of venue requirements for indictable offenses.
"CoLw. R. Civ. P. 12(h) (1941) ; IND. ANN. STAT. § 2-1011 (Burns 1946 Replacement);
Mo. R1v. STAT. ANN. § 847.66 (1942) ; VA. CODE ANN. § 8-133 (1950).
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